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Abstract 
Using firm-level data from 250 non-financial companies with 2,500 firm-year observations 
collecting from two stock exchange markets in Vietnam covering a 10-year period from 2008 to 
2017, this paper examines the relationship between information asymmetry and firm value in 
Vietnamese firms. The findings reveal that fundamentally, information asymmetry in Vietnamese 
firms has a negative impact on firm value. Although this conclusion is consistent with that in the 
literature underlying by pecking order and agency cost theories, the value of information 
asymmetry related variables is higher than that in similar studies conducted in other developed 
countries. The results also find that the financial leverage in Vietnamese firms is higher than in 
other developed countries but can only play a limited role in mitigating the negative impact of 
information asymmetry on firm value. All in all, the findings relating to all variables used in the 
study highlight that Vietnam is a typical emerging country because there is a clear distance with 
other developed countries. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Obtaining appropriate and accurate information is considered by investors as the most 
important precondition to make an investment decision, and thus the power of information is 
defined as the assumption for an efficient market. However, asymmetric information rather 
than information efficiency has been commonly observed in many markets. Akerlof’s 
pioneering work (1970) first defines the concept of information asymmetry and demonstrates 
in a market where sellers hold better information than buyers about the quality of products 
which can cause an adverse selection of low-quality products. Spence (1973) and Stiglitz (1974) 
late to further develop the concept, leading the three jointly won the Nobel Prize in 2001. 
 
Information asymmetry is thought of as a kind of market failure. When it exists, it not only 
affects the market value as a whole but also the value of the firms listed in the stock market. 
This is because information asymmetry could lead to individual investors and firms making 
wrong financial decisions with loss of their investment and the share value of firms. For 
example, firms with good wealth and large profits normally tend to use own recourse to finance 
business and avoid a large chunk of debts (Besbes and Boujelbene, 2014). However, if under 
the exposure of asymmetric information, the pecking order theory suggests that firms prefer an 
order of debt financing to the equities in order to reduce information risk (Myers and Majluf 
1984; Agarwal and O'Hara, (2007). Myers and Majluf (1984) point out that once a market 
cannot distinguish good or bad quality investment opportunities, firms in favourable positions 
often choose self-financing. These examples demonstrate information symmetry/asymmetry is 
an important factor in determining firms’ capital structure, investment decision and 
consequently firm value.  
 
Scholars have examined the linkages of market information asymmetry level, firm asset level, 
leverage level and firm value/performance (see examples, Botosan, 1997; D'Mello and Ferris, 
2000; D'Mello et al., 2008; Bharath et al., 2009; Drobetz et al., 2010; Fosu, 2013; He et al., 
2013; Gao and Zhu, 2015; Focu et al., 2016). From these studies, readers understand how 
information asymmetry impacts firms in developed countries such as the US (Botosan, 1997; 
D'Mello and Ferris, 2000; D'Mello et al., 2008; Bharath et al., 2009), the UK (Focu et al., 2016), 
Australia (He et al., 2013), other developing countries such as South Africa (He et al., 2013) 
or across different countries (Drobetz et al., 2010; Gao and Zhu, 2015). However, less evidence 
found in the literature relating to the relationship between information asymmetry, leverage 
level and firm value in Vietnam. Vietnam is an emerging country in South-East Asia with rapid 
development in recent decades and is also in the process of transforming from a traditional 
socialist economy to a market economy. It thus can be reasonably predicted that there should 
have some different characteristics in terms of the relationship between information asymmetry, 
leverage level and firm value, compared to that in other developed countries or other 
developing countries in different geographical regions.     
 
To develop an understanding of the difference of this topic in the Vietnamese context, this 
paper aims to examine the relationship between information asymmetry and firm value in 
Vietnamese listed firms. In order to carry out a reasonable comparison, this study purposely is 
designed to adopt similar methodology used by Fosu et al. (2016) in the UK to capture a rough 
distance/feature between a developing country and a developed nation. Our firm-level data 
include 250 non-financial companies with 2,500 firm-year observations collecting from two 
stock exchange markets in Vietnam covering a 10-year period from 2008 to 2017. Least squares 
based on Pooled OLS ((Pooded Ordinary Least Square), Fixed-Effect Model (FEM) and 
Random-Effect Model (REM), GMM one step (one-step generalized method of moments) are 
employed to analyse data.  The findings report that there are a number of differences regarding 
the research variables used and a clear distance that Vietnam is behind the UK, though a 
negative impact of information asymmetry on firm value is observed in both countries.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follow: section 2 develops hypotheses based on theoretical 
reasoning, section 3 explains the methods used in the study, section 4 presents results, and 
section 5 makes a final conclusion.   
 
2. Theoretical reasoning and hypothesis formulation 
 
The concept of information asymmetry was created from the study of The Market for Lemons’ 
theory (Akerlof, 1970) which originally refers to product buyers have less information about 
product quality they bought than the sellers. Since then, a number of influential theories relating 
to information asymmetry have been developed, such as Signalling Theory by Spence (1973) 
and Stiglitz (1974) and Pecking Order Theory (POT) by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf 
(1984). POT specifically suggests that the management (agent) inside a company has better 
information about the firm’s actual value than outside shareholders (principal). As such, the 
cost of adverse selection arising from information asymmetry leads to the priority of using debt 
financing rather than equity financing (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Afterwards, many scholars 
have provided theoretical arguments and empirical evidence to support POT.  For example, the 
research of Botosan et al. (1997) evaluates the cost of equity and find it has a strong connection 
with firm value. A study from Ryen et al. (1997) is considered as the further development of 
the information asymmetry and its relationship related to investment decisions as well as firm 
valuation. This research proves that insiders of a firm have more information than outside 
investors leading to newly issued shares undervalued. In addition, Dierkens (1991) demonstrate 
that at the time of issuing equity, the extent of information asymmetry is relatively low, 
however, it increases alongside the distribution of predictions of the capital cost by analysts.  
Furthermore, the relationships among information asymmetry and higher equity cost 
(Dierkens, 1991 and Botosan, 1997), high levels of financial leverage (Bharath et al., 2009; 
Gao and Zhu, 2015; Fosu et al. 2016) and lower value of cash have been researched. 
Importantly, Drobetz et al. (2010) emphasize the role of free cash flow under the condition of 
asymmetric information. Then based on the idea in Drobetz et al. (2010), Fosu et al. (2016, 
p.141) further develop the research argument by “conditioning the relationship between firm 
value and information asymmetry on firms' level of financial leverage”. In a similar vein, 
Drobetz et al. (2010) remarkably indicate the calculation methods and employing quantitative 
techniques for measuring variables can convey asymmetric information. This study uses the 
dispersion of analysts' forecasts and error in analysts’ forecasts as the main measurements of 
information asymmetry and Fosu et al. (2016) also follow these measures.   
 
2.1. The impact of information asymmetry on firm value  
 
As discussed above, how a firm makes its capital structure choice and investment decision are 
debated and studied by many scholars. A well-known theory to explain this is Pecking Order 
Theory established by Myers (1984), and Myers and Majluf (1984). POT not only highlights 
the decision-making process of whether a firm opts issuing equity capital or debt financing in 
the environment of information asymmetry, but also the consequence of costs of the firm’s 
value because of the decision. As we know, for a principal-agent problem, managers of firms 
often hold more information about the firm’s performance, asset value and prosperity than the 
investors (shareholders). In other words, information about the firm hold by insiders and 
outsiders are asymmetric. According to the POT, in a firm with a higher degree of information 
asymmetry, managers are more realistic and more likely to propose newly issued equity capital 
under-priced (Fosu et al., 2016), and they also tend to invest in projects having potentially 
positive NPV (Myers, 1984). However, shareholders in the firm do not have the same level of 
information and cannot agree with the decision of the managers. As such, they are more likely 
to reject these projects with potentially positive NPV because the under-pricing equities diluted 
their investment wealth. Consequently, the firm would lose good investment opportunities (i.e. 
resources are misallocated) and firm value would be reduced (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
Therefore, information asymmetry is costly to firms because of adversely selecting cost which 
prevents the firms to opt cheap financing and consequently reduces the firm value (Fosu et al., 
2016).  
 
Myers and Majluf’s POT has been empirically proved by many studies in other countries, and 
examples include Dierkens (1991), Ryen et al. (1997), Botosan (1997), Bharath et al. (2008), 
Drobetz et al. (2010), Fauver and Naranjo (2010), Gao and Zhu (2015) and Fosu et al. (2016). 
The principle of information asymmetry in Vietnamese firms are the same, though Vietnam is 
still classified as an emerging market. We thus have our first hypothesis formulated as:  
  
 H1: Information asymmetry in Vietnamese firms is negatively correlated with firm value. 
 
2.2. The role of financial leverage between information asymmetry and firm value  
 
POT has another assumption that financial leverage (i.e. debt financing) can help firms mitigate 
the adversely selected costs caused by information asymmetry (Fosu et al., 2016). This is 
because, for a firm, external equity capital is the most information-sensitive security compared 
to debt financing.  When managers in a firm have superior information about the firm than the 
firm owners (investors), they would prefer (if possible) issuing less information-sensitive 
security (i.e. opting debt financing) over equity capital, once the firm requires external 
financing (Myers and Majluf, 1984). The reason behind this is because issuing new stock/share 
will involve future dividend pay-out whereas dividend payout ratios are quite sticky (Myers, 
1984). In other words, the firm’s leverage has played an important role in its information 
asymmetry and firm value.  
 
A significant number of studies provide empirical evidence to support the assumption. Among 
them, earlier research includes, for example, Ryen et al. (1997), Grossman and Hart (1982) and 
Opler and Titman (1994), as well as recent articles of Bharath et al. (2009), Gao and Zhu (2015) 
and Fosu et al. (2016). The findings from these studies are generally consistent and confirm 
prioritising debt financing over issuing external equity and keeping healthy cash flow are 
effective ways of reducing information asymmetry and generating firm value (Fosu et al., 
2016). Similarly, the principle should be applied in Vietnamese companies, and we thus expect 
our second hypothesis expressed as:  
 
H2: Financial leverage in Vietnamese firms can reduce the negative impact of information 
asymmetry on firm value. 
 
 
3. Methods  
 
3.1. Sample  
 
To test our hypotheses developed in the last section, we firstly collect listing companies in the 
two stock exchange markets in Vietnam (i.e. HOSE and HNX). As of December 26, 2016, 
there were 699 firms on the list.1 Followed a standard practice proposed by other scholars (e.g. 
Gao and Zhu, 2015; Fosu et al., 2016), financial and utility companies are excluded because 
their businesses can be more likely influenced by government’s policies and regulations. We 
then visit relevant websites2 to collect individual companies’ financial data. Additional criteria 
are applied to maintain data quality. For example, we drop the firms from the sample if (1) 
their financial statements are not disclosed following accounting standard, (2) the companies 
with negative equity; and (3) the firms with missing values for three consecutive firm-year 
observations. In this case, our final firm-level data include 2,500 firm-year observations (i.e. 
yearly data for 250 firms)3 and the investigation period is 10-year long from 2008 to 2017.  
 
3.2. Information asymmetry measurement  
 
By referring the work done by Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), Drobetz et al. (2010) 
and Fosu et al. (2016), we use the dispersion of analysts' forecasts (Asy-Disp) and analysts’ 
forecast error (Asy-Er) as the main measures of information asymmetry in order to examine its 
relationship with firm value. 
 
 
1 https://vietstock.vn/2017/01/chuyen-niem-yet-2016-it-nhung-dinh-dam-741-512080.htm  
2 Such as,  http://cafef.vn/; https://www.cophieu68.vn/export.php; 
https://www.stockbiz.vn/CompanyAZ.aspx?Alphabet=P.  
3 A list of sample firms is available upon request.  
The dispersion of analysts’ forecasts (Asy-Disp) is the standard deviation of analysts forecast 
about earning per share (EPS) of the fiscal year. It is expected a higher level of dispersion 
represents a higher level of information asymmetry (Krishnaswami.et al., 1999; Drobetz et al., 
2010). According to Fosu et al. (2016), the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts can be expressed 
as:  
 
Asy-Disp = ln(1+ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆.𝑑𝑑 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆|𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆 |  ) 
 
 
The error of analysts forecast (Asy-Er) is the difference between the forecast of analysts 
earnings per share and the actual earnings per share for the fiscal year (Krishnaswami et al., 
1999; Drobetz et al., 2010). A higher level of error forecast suggests a higher level of 
asymmetric information. For each fiscal year, the latest forecast has been used to make sure 
the representativeness of the forecast at the year-end. Besides, to ensure the comparability 
across sample companies relating to the asymmetric information measures, we have adjusted 
to the median forecast of analysts in the fiscal year (Drobetz et al., 2010; Fosu et al., 2016). 
The error of analysts forecast (Asy-Er) can be formulated as:  
 
Asy-Er = Ln�1 + �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓−𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎�|𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆| � 
 
 
EPS forecast is an important value used by the authors to estimate the calculation of Asy 
variables for model testing in this paper. EPS forecast is calculated by using the previous year's 
EPS results and combined with EPS (g) growth through ROE and retained rate of return, 
parameters collected and processed from information asymmetry published. For example, to 
calculate the EPS forecast for year N, the actual EPS of N-1 year is used, the ROE value in 
year N-1 is b and the N-1 retained rate is C, then the calculated result is a * (1+ (b * c)). 
 
 
The third measure of information asymmetry (Asy-Dummy) is used. It is a dummy variable: 1 
representing if the dispersion of analysts is larger than the median forecast in the industry; 0 
otherwise. Using this additional measure is because according to Fosu et al. (2016), it can 
effectively capture companies which have higher information asymmetry compared to their 
peers in the same sector. The sectors in our sample have also followed the classification of 
Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) which include: Oil and Gas, basic materials, 
industrials, consumer goods, consumer services, telecommunication, and technology.  
 
Asy- Disp is considered as the deviation of the forecast and Asy – Dummy is a variable set to 
determine the dispersal deviation, therefore. If Asy – Disp is bigger than the estimated value 
of Asy – Disp’s average during years of study, the value is “1”; if all the predictions have the 
deviation reversed, the value is “0”. However, according to Drobetz (2010) and Fosu et al. 
(2016), the meaning of Asy – Dummy is considered as a forecasted result by at least two 
forecasters of the company. Because predicting is difficult, the authors use the accepting value 
of conclusion to give the numbers in a variable set of Asy – Dummy.   
 
3.3. Firm value measurement and control variables  
 
The firm value (Value) is measured as the ratio of the market value of assets to book value of 
assets as in Muray and Pajuste (2005). The market value of assets is measured by the number 
of outstanding shares. This is the critical value (the dependent variable) in our research model. 
The relationship between a firm's leverage to the firm's value is also key for the study. We thus 
consider firms’ leverage as another key variable. Leverage (LEV) is the ratio of the book value 
of debts to book value of assets. The adoption of book value is to reduce the potential reverse 
causation from firm value to leverage (Opler and Titman, 1994; Fosu et al., 2016). 
 
We further control for a number of variables not included in the hypotheses which consist of 
firm size, tangible assets and sales growth followed Muray and Pajuste (2005) and Fosu et al. 
(2016). Firm size (Size) is measured as the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. 
According to Maury and Pajuste (2005), when firms tend to larger and mature, their valuation 
would be lower. It is therefore that we can expect a negative relationship between firm size and 
firm value. Tangible assets (Tang) is measured as the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. 
Firms with a significant proportion of tangible assets have less value generated from intangible 
assets (for example human capital) (Muray and Pajuste, 2005). This argument indicates a 
negative relationship between tangible asset and firm value. However, on the other hand, firms 
with more tangible assets might be less asymmetric information and more values generated. 
As such the expected effect of tangible assets on firm value is still unclear. Sale Growth 
(Growth) is the annual growth rate of a firm' sales which is expressed by fractions. A positive 
relationship between sale growth and firm value is expected because firms with high growth 
are turned to having higher valuation (Muray and Pajuste, 2005).  
 
In Table 1, the variables used in the study and their expected prediction are summarised.  
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
3.4. Analytic model  
 
In this sub-section, we introduce the research model used to test our hypotheses. In order to 
“take advantage of the variations in the variable of interest over time” (Fosu et al. 2016, p. 
143), we also consider a panel data approach in the analysis. Following the advanced statistic 
techniques used in the studies such as Muray and Pajuste (2005), Gao and Zhu et al. (2015) 
and Fosu et al. (2016), we firstly use Pooled-OLS, FEM and REM to generate appropriate 
results based on cross-sectional and time series data, which are statistically augmented into 
panel data; and secondly, one-step GMM is employed to exclude endogenous error in the 
model. In other words, GMM is used to test the sustainability of the model.  
 
In order to test H1, the firm value is defined as a function of firm size (Size), tangible assets 
(Tang) and sales growth (Growth) (collectively termed as Controls in the equation). To test H2, 
leverage (Lev) and other extensions are used for measuring the effects of asymmetric 
information (Asy) (Fosu et al., 2016). As such, the baseline model can be formulated to: 
 
 
                           𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆= α0+𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆+ 𝛽𝛽1 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆+∑  𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘42  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆+ γ𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆+Ɛ𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆 (Eq.1) 
 
Which can be further expressed into the three analytic models:  
 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆= α0+λ𝑆𝑆+ 𝛽𝛽1 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆+∑  𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘42  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉����������������⃗ 𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆+ 𝛽𝛽5AsyDisp (Model 1) (Eq.2) 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆= α0+λ𝑆𝑆+ 𝛽𝛽1 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆+∑  𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘42  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉����������������⃗ 𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆+ 𝛽𝛽5𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 (Model 2) (Eq.3) 
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆= α0+λ𝑆𝑆+ 𝛽𝛽1 𝐿𝐿𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆+∑  𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘42  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉����������������⃗ 𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆+ 𝛽𝛽5𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 (Model 3) (Eq.4) 
 
Where Ɛit is the combination error term comprising of firm fixed effect µi and a component 
assumption being independent and identically distributed ( Vit ); α, β, γ are parameters, 
subscripts i and t are firm i and time t, k indicates control variables 
 
4. Results  
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
To understand the characteristics of our data, a summary of descriptive statistics is disclosed 
in Table 2.  
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
In Table 2, the ratio of average firm value (Value) of our sample firm-year is 0.969 (in Fosu et 
al., 2016, UK is 1.438)4. The average ratio of leverage (Lev) is 0.7146 (the UK is 0.174). 
Annual tangible assets (Tang) account for 46.37% (the UK is 30.1%) the total assets while the 
total revenue growth reaches 41.17% (the UK is 12.2%) which implies the rapid growth of the 
firms (however, the minimum figure (-0.9989) suggests some companies are with negative sale 
growth). The average values of the two variables representing asymmetric information (Asy-
Disp and Asy-Er) are 0.7824 and 0.7418 respectively (the UK are 0.193 and 0.262). The mean 
value of the third variable for the asymmetric information (Asy-Dummy) is 0.2272 (the UK is 
0.503) which shows that for almost one-fifth of the observed firm-year data, the dispersion in 
analysts’ forecast is higher than the industry average forecast. 
 
By comparing our results with that in the Fosu et al. (2016) conducted in the UK, we can see 
there are big differences in terms of information asymmetry and development level between 
Vietnam and a developed country such as the UK. The leverage rate (0.7146) in Vietnams firms 
is much higher than that in UK firms (0.174). Putting this result in the tax environment of 
M&M theory (Modigliani and Miller, 1963), it indicates UK firms have abundant equity to 
maintain business.  
 
4.2. Correlation check 
 
4 We cite equivalent figures in brackets from a UK study conducted by Fosu et al. (2016) for the purpose of 
comparison.    
 
Before conducting a regression analysis, multicollinearity among independent variables needs 
to be examined. We carry out correlation analysis and the correlation matrix is presented in 
Table 3.  
Insert Table 3 here 
 
It can be seen from the result that the correlation coefficients for all variables in the table are 
low which suggests the improbability of multicollinearity. We further prove it by testing the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and the result shows that all coefficients are less than ten 
indicating no multicollinearity in the data set (Kennedy, 1992). Table 3 also shows that all of 
three information asymmetry related variables (i.e. Asy-Disp, Asy-Er and Asy-Dummy) are 
negatively correlated with firm value (Value), Asy-Disp and Asy-Dummy are also negatively 
correlated with firm leverage (Lev), and the results preliminarily support our Hypothesis 1.  
 
4.3 Regression  
 
Firstly, we run OLS (Ordinary Least Square Pooled -Pooled-OLS) regression for the Model 1, 
Model 2 and Model 3 formulated in 3.4. The purpose of employing OLS regression is to 
evaluate the impact of independent variables on dependent ones. The results are shown in Table 
4.  
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
Reading the results in Table 4, all three variables measuring information asymmetry are not 
statistically significant. In this case, we decide to apply Fixed-Effect Model (FEM) and 
Random-Effect Model (REM) to further assess the impact of asymmetric information variables 
on dependent variables. The results are shown in Table 5.  
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
The FEM is used to analyse the correlation between residuals and explanatory variables by 
controlling and separating the effect of individual characteristics from explanatory variables. 
Therefore, the real influence of explanatory variables on dependent ones can be estimated 
accurately.   
   
According to the regression result in Table 5, most variables representing information 
asymmetry have a significantly negative impact on the firm value. This means the presence of 
information asymmetry will lower the firm’s value. The regression coefficient of Asy-Disp in 
REM and FEM ranges is -0.0866 and -0.997 respectively. Additionally, the coefficient also has 
high statistical significance at 1% level in the FEM as well as economic significance at which 
an increase in the standard deviation of Asy-Disp will reduce firm value. 
 
The regression result of Asy-Er using FEM and REM in model 2 suggests that the variable has 
a positive impact on firm value; however, it is not statistically significant. In model 3, the 
regression coefficient of Asy-Dummy corresponding to REM and FEM values from -0.3351 to 
-3.068 and has statistical significance in FEM. It implies that a transition of information 
asymmetry from low to a high level is associated with a significant reduction in firm value. 
 
Regarding the impact of leverage on enterprise value, the regression result in Table 5 shows 
the leverage has a positive impact on the firm value, despite the magnitude is quite small. 
However, the coefficient is not statically significant. 
 
All other control variables are found statistically significant at less than 1% level. Specifically, 
both Size and Growth have negative coefficients at -2.8644 and -0.1555 respectively, 
suggesting they have a negative impact on dependent variables. The two variables are 
significant in both statistics and economy which means when Size of a company is large, and 
Growth of the company is strong to a certain extent, and an increase in size and growth will 
lead to a reduction in firm value. These findings are consistent with that in the research of 
Murray and Pajuste (2005). The coefficient of Tang is positive at 2.1135 representing a positive 
impact on dependent variables. It suggests that tangible assets compensate for the loss of 
intangible assets for firm value. 
 
We further conduct the Hausman test to select the most suitable model. The result reveals that 
Hausman p-value in both models is less than 0.05. Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is 
rejected which means the coefficients estimated by the Random Effect model are not as 
efficient as the coefficients in the Fixed Effect model. Accordingly, applying the FEM method 
in all models will bring a more consistent result. 
 
After verifying homoscedasticity, autocorrelation and endogeneity errors in the models, the 
one-step GMM method is applied to fix errors presented in the models (1), (2), (3). The main 
reason to choose one-step GMM rather than system-GMM is to ensure the parsimony theorem 
of statistics. The result of one-step GMM is reported in Table 6. The results of one-step GMM 
estimation in Table 6 are similar to what we reported in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
Insert Table 6 here 
 
All three variables measuring information asymmetry (Asy-Disp, Asy-Er and Asy-Dummy) 
adversely influence on firm value (Value), indicating a negative relationship between 
information asymmetry and firm value. As such, the first hypothesis (H1: Information 
asymmetry in Vietnamese firms is negatively correlated with firm value) has been confirmed. 
The result broadly is consistent with the findings in other studies mentioned in 2.1.  
 
With regards to firms’ financial leverage (Lev), although the variable is positively correlated 
with the firm value (Value), it has no statistical significance in all the three models. Due to the 
insignificant effect of leverage on firm value in our estimation, we can say that in Vietnamese 
firms, financial leverage can help increase the firm value which in turn offsets or mitigates the 
negative impact of information asymmetry, however, its role perhaps is limited. The finding 
thus partially supports the second hypothesis (H2: Financial leverage in Vietnamese firms can 
reduce the negative impact of information asymmetry on firm value).  
 
In terms of firm size and growth, the findings suggest that Size and Growth have a negative 
impact of on firm value (Value) and the results are in line with the finding in Murray and 
Pajuste (2005).  
 
Finally, our result also shows that firms’ tangible assets (Tang) positively affect firm value 
indicating tangible assets can compensate the loss of intangible assets and the finding is also 
consistent with that in the studies of Muray and Pajuste (2005) and Fosu et al. (2016).  
 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
First, if taking a comparative view to compare our results with a similar study conducted in the 
UK by Fosu et al. (2016), we can summarise: (1) the firm value of our sample is lower than 
that in the UK; (2) the average leverage for Vietnamese firms is much higher than that in the 
UK firms; (3) the level of tangible assets for Vietnamese firms is also higher than that in the 
UK firms; (4) the total revenue growth for Vietnamese firms is much higher than that in the 
UK firms; and (5) the information asymmetry for Vietnamese firms is much higher than that 
in the UK firms. This comparison clearly shows a difference between Vietnam as an emerging 
and developing country and the UK as a developed country. Second, our paper proves, with 
strong evidence, that information asymmetry in Vietnam has a significant negative effect on 
firm value. The negative relationship is consistent with other studies mentioned earlier and 
supports POT and agent cost theories but the extent of the negative effect on firm value in 
Vietnam is stronger. Third, our results also suggest that despite the financial leverage in 
Vietnamese firms is high, however, its role in mitigating the negative impact of information 
asymmetry on firm value is limited, unlike in the UK.  
 
Our study contributes to the existing literature in two-fold: (1) it addresses a less explored area 
by examining the impact of information asymmetry on firm value in developing countries, 
particularly in Vietnam – an emerging but catching up the economy. The meaning for carrying 
out such research is to provide with an impression of how far these developing countries are 
behind developed countries in terms of the relationship between information asymmetry and 
firm value.  Our finding confirms a negative relationship between asymmetric information and 
firm value in Vietnam, which shares the similarity with the results in other studies in the 
literature; (2)  in Vietnamese context , firms cannot use the financial leverage to control the 
level of asymmetric information, whereas in Fosu et al. (2016),  the result indicates that the UK 
firms can take financial leverage as a tool to mitigate the effect of asymmetric information. The 
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Information Asymmetry and firm value: Is Vietnam different? 
Tables  
Table 1 Summary of variables 
Variable Measurement Expected sign Reference 
 
Asy-Disp Dispersion of analysts’ forecasts - Drobetz et al. (2010), Fosu et al. (2016) 
 
Asy-Er Error analysts’ forecast 
 
- Drobetz et al. (2010), Fosu et al. (2016) 
Asy-Dummy 1, if the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts 
is greater than the industry average 
forecast; otherwise 0.  
 
- Drobetz et al. (2010), Fosu et al. (2016) 
Value The ratio of market value of assets to 
book value of assets 
 
 Muray and Pajuste (2005), Fosu et al. 
(2016) 
Lev The ratio of book value of debts to book 
value of assets  
+/- Danso and Adomako (2014), Fosu 
(2013), Opler and Titman (1994), Fosu 
et al. (2016) 
 
Size The natural logarithm of the book value 
of total assets  
 
- Muray and Pajuste (2005), Fosu et al. 
(2016) 
Tang The ratio of tangible assets to total assets  +/- Muray and Pajuste (2005), Fosu et al. 
(2016) 




Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
  Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Value 0.9690 16.6948 0 6.1358 
Lev 0.7146 11.48497 0 5.7447 
Size 27.6470 1.2889 19.4431 32.8926 
Growth 0.4117 3.1215 -0.9989 
0.8825 
 
Tang 0.4637 6.8277 0 
2.6711 
 
Asy-Disp 0.7824 0.8641 0 7.1621 
Asy-Er 0.7418 0.8575 0 7.7140 
Asy-Dummy 0.2272 0.4191 0 1 
Note: Variable observations are 2500  
 
Table 3 Correlation matrix 
 Value Lev Size Growth Tang Asy-Disp Asy-Dummy Asy-Er 
Value 1.0000        
Lev -0.0004 1.0000       
Size -0.1639 0.0163 1.0000      
Growth -0.0027 -0.0020 0.0169 1.0000     
Tang 0.8904 -0.0016 -0.1392 -0.0090 1.0000    
Asy-Disp -0.0118 -0.0057 0.0823 0.1002 -0.0052 1.0000   
Asy-Dummy -0.0228 -0.0107 -0.0265 0.0708 -0.0180 0.6738 1.0000  
Asy-Er -0.0047 0.0009 -0.0085 0.0969 -0.0130 0.6399 0.4797 1.0000 
 
 
Table 4 OLS regression 



























































Table 5 FEM and REM regression 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 

















-0.5249***    
[0.1191] 






-0.5330***   
[0.1188] 
Growth 
-0.1555***   
[0.0503] 
0.0342   
[0.0488] 









2.1135***    
[0.0240] 






2.1141***    
[0.0240] 
2.163***   
[0.0224] 
Asy-Disp 




    






Asy-Dummy     














Note: ***, **, * are the significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard errors of the corresponding coefficients are reflected in square brackets. 
 
Table 6 GMM regression 















































                                 Note: ***, **, * are the significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard errors of the corresponding coefficients are reflected in square brackets. 
 
 
 
